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analysts and Member countries believed that the multilateral system for the management of the global economy was largely complete. 2 Today, that initial optimism has evaporated. 3 Calls for 'open regionalism,' where likeminded countries agree on deep liberalization strategies are becoming more pronounced. 4 For big business and governments alike, trade rounds that last the better part of a decade are becoming irrelevant in a world were money and business move faster than ever. Furthermore, the WTO is enmeshed in a dangerous cycle of recrimination, bluffs and brinksmanship. Even
Pascal Lamy, formerly European Trade Commissioner and now the current Director
General, is unsure whether the WTO will pull out of its long, slow descent.
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The organization is caught between powerful competing interests and factions, and many experts have tried to explain its institutional paralysis. 6 This paper argues that the primary causes of the WTO's troubled state are twofold. First, with the rise of new global trading powers such as India, China and Brazil, the geopolitical playing field is in flux and the steady accumulation of political and market power in the global South has sapped the WTO's forward momentum. 7 The conventional wisdom holds that the singleundertaking, wherein membership requires that states sign all existing multilateral trade agreements, one of the WTO's foundational innovations, is sufficient to discipline Members and lock in progressive liberalization. But the reality contradicts this assumption. Members from both the North and the South have proven to be adept at exploiting the legal loopholes of the system and at blocking consensus in contentious areas. Judith Goldstein blames the devolution of multilateralism toward regional and bilateral platforms on the drive by the US in the Uruguay Round for judiciable legal norms and enforceable dispute settlement rules that have created an organizational rigidity in the WTO. Three-quarters of the WTO's membership are developing countries and this fact goes a long way towards explaining the current changes underway in the liberalization dynamic. The new southern geographies of power agree with the United States on one thing -a bad deal is worse than no deal at all. Susan Schwab, the US Trade
Representative hit the nail on the head when she said that "if you do one of these once every generation, and your objective is to liberalize trade, why would you settle for something that doesn't do a whole lot to liberalize trade?" 9 So far the prospect of even an insubstantial but face-saving 'Doha-lite' conclusion to the negotiations seems uncertain.
The second factor in the decline of trade multilateralism is a cocktail of rigid rules, non-tariff protectionism, and a crisis of representation that throws sand in the institutional gears of multilateral trade. As a general rule, trade agreements do not eliminate protectionist sentiments or the ability of governments to vigorously defend production and employment interests. 10 Rather, they keep these at politically acceptable levels. Even the current liberal order has failed to fully embed a liberalized framework 8 Barton et al, 2006 . See also B. for competition in its otherwise comprehensive regulatory system. 11 The WTO's subsidy and antidumping agreements were supposed to be a significant step beyond the arrangement of exemptions and waivers that typified GATT trade governance, but more than three thousand antidumping notifications suggest otherwise. Yet competition policy is not even on the WTO's radar for this round because agricultural liberalization issues are more pressing. For most members, agricultural market access symbolizes for most members the massive trade imbalance between north and south.
12
Dispute settlement is the most significant deliverable of WTO governance and embodies all that is both problematic and progressive about the trade institution. 13 This paper attempts to clarify some of the most important challenges to the legal rules that govern international economic behaviour. We analyze a number of important and unforeseen institutional consequences of the shift from an informal GATT mechanism to the mandatory norms and processes of WTO litigation. 14 The tougher rules and higher standards contribute disproportionately to the current negotiating deadlock. 15 WTO negotiations have entered an extended pause as Members step back to regroup and reconsider their trading needs.
The paper concludes by hypothesizing that we are at the end of the golden era of postwar multilateralism and entering an era of aggressive regionalization. 16 The devolution of the principles and aims of multilateralism to the regional level represents a major shift in the world trading system. 17 This is not the first time the world has been faced with systemic changes in the international economy. cotton sector did the impossible, reorganizing production in order to effectively compete in global markets for cotton. Thousands of producers were forced out of the industry, subsidies were cut and incomes fell dramatically for those who remained. Today, West
African cotton sells for 22 cents a pound. In contrast, American cotton costs about 88 cents per pound to produce. According to economic logic, West African cotton should have a comparative advantage in the United States, but it is not allowed into the country.
According to economists, doing away with these market distorting measures in agricultural and textile sectors would add more than $300 billion to the value of global trade in agricultural products. 31 The reality is likely to be more complex. Ultimately, negotiators from the developed countries strong-armed reluctant participants, is no longer an effective mechanism for consensus-building.
Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development. Hudec likens the rise of non-tariff barriers to the uncovering of submerged stumps when draining a swamp. 36 As tariff barriers fall, other forms of trade protectionism rise in importance. WTO jurisprudence is not far advanced and cannot give clear guidance in the areas of public policy dealing with predatory subsidies, dumping, and international competition policy. 37 It is one of the institutional oddities of the WTO that at the heart of the organization there remains a well-advanced and member-sanctioned system of legalized non-tariff protectionism. In fact, WTO membership may even provide a built-in incentive for states to develop antidumping legislation in order to fully utilize all legal competition strategies available.
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Dumping is the practice of exporting a product for less than the cost of producing it, or for less than the 'normal value' of the product on the firm's home market. 39 In domestic markets, producers sometimes sell their goods below cost in an effort to clear inventory or break into a market dominated by rival producers. On the whole, this practice benefits consumers. However, in international trade, selling goods for less than the cost of production is considered to be an unfair form of competition. Antidumping is a global bad because it is frequently used by the global north against southern producers whose primary comparative advantage is cheap labour. against each other to protect market share for domestic industries -needless to say, antidumping measures are frequently subject to abuse. 44 NME status is a magnet for antidumping violations. Imagine that a Chinese firm produces handbags and sells them at home for $10 apiece and in foreign markets for the same price. Handbag manufacturers in the US, who sell their product for $25 apiece, complain to the Department of Commerce that Chinese manufacturers are dumping handbags on the American market. Article 2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement states that "a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country."
The real issue behind the use of these trade measures is the changing geography of power driven by a global redistribution of labour, not unfair trade practices per se.
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China has been slapped with 338 antidumping measures since its accession five years ago. 46 The most frequent complainants have been the EU, US and India, who applied measures against Chinese chemicals, base metals and electronics. China, however, has learned the value of antidumping measures for protecting domestic producers as well. As one of the most active users of antidumping measures, China has imposed dozens of measures on chemicals from the EU, steel from Japan, and paper from the United States and Korea, as the list of the top ten antidumping remedy initiators shows below (see The usual test of dumping is a comparison of handbag prices on the domestic market and their price in foreign markets. But China is a non-market economy according to the WTO, which means that its industries are assumed to be heavily subsidized and this would drive down the price of handbags in the domestic market. So the WTO allows complainants to use a proxy market to test domestic prices. If the Department of Commerce examines the price of handbags on the Indian market, and finds that they are sold for $15 apiece, antidumping duties may be levied against Chinese handbags. NME status means that even if Chinese handbags are produced according to free market rules, manufacturers may still face steep duties when selling in the US. 45 Antidumping measures are a blunt instrument wielded against China because northern manufacturing has been hard hit by China's rise. The export surges, in textiles for example, are unlike anything seen before. 
The Evolution of Antidumping in the GATT/WTO System
The regulation of non-tariff protectionism is now an important part of any modern trade regime because liberal antidumping laws at the transnational level often act as a stand-in for an international competition policy. 47 Competition policy is off the and the wealthiest traders ought to be alarmed by the failure to get the rules right for the poorest members.
Retaliatory Dynamics
Global trade politics has developed its own institutional forms and challenges.
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Many of the disputes brought by the developed north to the DSM have roots in previous cases. Sometimes, as in the Bananas Case, they are the result of long-running bilateral disputes that the WTO is unable to resolve. Other times, as in the Boeing/Airbus disputes between the US and EU, they are the result of retaliatory litigation. This retaliatory dynamic is the result of clashing norms and standards. 67 One area where this dynamic is most in evidence is the area of food safety because the EU has imposed extensive restrictions on genetically modified organisms. It touches a raw nerve for civil society 66 In almost fifty years, the GATT heard more than 400 cases. only southern interests. If the WTO is to survive future rounds, southern countries will need to buy into the DSM in a way they have not in the past ten years.
So far, there is little optimism for a sea-change in DSM usage. Only 67 members are on record as having participated in at least one dispute, and 33 of these have been involved in three or fewer cases (see Figure 4 below). Canada, the US, the European Union and Japan file the largest number of complaints and responses -unsurprisingly they account for around 60% of the world's merchandise exports. The US is far and away the biggest user of the consultations system, filing at least 30% more complaints than the EU, and almost twice as many responses.
Most users of the DSM have little experience with the panel process, and many developing nations are only tangentially involved in dispute settlement although they have large interests at stake. For example many developing countries were involved on both sides in the Bananas dispute, which paradoxically was actually a market access battle between the EU and US. 71 The US succeeded in reasserting its long-standing geopolitical interests in Central and South American markets. The irony is that the WTO system was supposed to empower small trading countries and mitigate historic power inequalities. Instead it pitted poor African and Caribbean nations against small economies in Latin America. This case is typical of current dispute settlement dynamics in which developing countries are enlisted proxies for the hard power interests of the global 83 The social safety nets of developed countries already absorb some of the costs of structural adjustment. France, the US, Germany and Holland compensate the victims of free trade through job retraining, income replacement and long term unemployment benefits.
countries as well. 84 Bhagwati has called for greater labour mobility for service providers from the global South. 85 In the north, the central issues are income replacement and education. Part of this compensation package must be a reform package at the WTO that recognizes the unique importance of equity in development. It is an idea long overdue, and without it, global free trade is without a viable future. It will likely take more than a decade to win this ideological battle for compensation, but the international trade regime of the future will be a very different place. Whether it will be a more equitable system depends upon how the WTO meets two important challenges in the upcoming years.
The first challenge comes from the WTO's inward-looking focus on its own rules and practices -often to the exclusion of other sources of public international law. There has never been a comfortable fit among the dozens of treaties, conventions, diplomatic understandings and legal principles that comprise the body of public international law. and far between are its triumphs. After a decade the WTO is still not pulling its weight. It was intended to be the epicentre of a new international order, but rather than presiding over a bigger and more robust system of international public law, it has become a juridical silo.
The second challenge will be learning to live with diverse forms of regionalism.
Doctrinaire trade theorists are alarmed about the growth of regional trade agreements.
But it is quickly becoming common knowledge that a single model of integration does not suit the whole world. For example, the model of integration developed by Europe, that emphasizes political integration and common markets would not work in North
America. But the North American model of integration that emphasizes negative rights (thou shalt not) over positive rights may enhance economic opportunity, but at the expense of vulnerable social groups. Other regions will develop their own brands of integration, as Russia is currently doing in Central Asia. In the east, China is also crafting a sphere of influence with its own forms of economic integration. Asymmetries in the global trading system are likely to continue to grow. In the future we will likely see a multi-tier trading system in which bilateral, regional and multilateral arrangements exist together in a more systematized way. Trade multilateralism cannot be sustained by clever legalistic juggling and ambitious bureaucrats trained in the dark arts of public relations. 91 Multilateralism is in for a rough ride as the US, EU and other regional powers look for new frames within which to pursue their strategic interests. The golden era of postwar trade multilateralism is over. A new configuration of collective economic regulation is on the rise. Perhaps the clearest indication of this regime shift is the slow death of the Doha Round.
So far it is unclear what impact, if any, the lack of forward movement in the Doha
Round will have on the global economy. Global merchandise trade is growing at 6%
annually and services trade at a phenomenal 10% each year. 92 This is more than twice the average rate of growth in OECD countries. In China, India and Brazil, an emerging middle class is driving domestic growth at rates that challenge the economic superiority of North America and Europe. 93 In 2006 the Economist reported that half of the world's industrial products are now produced in the global South. According to the newest research, within a decade, twenty percent of Fortune Five Hundred firms will be southern multinationals. 94 Neither Marxian dependency theory nor neoliberal economic theory foretold such a large-scale transformation.
A new balance of power is emerging in the heart of the World Trade Organization. 95 Global free trade is now in its third configuration and it again faces major challenges from inter-capitalist rivalry, new trans-national social forces and a plethora of competing ideas about the world trading order and global governance. For scholars concerned with the social impact of trade, the central issue that needs to be addressed is that there are too many losers and not enough winners, both at the negotiating table as well as in the dispute settlement system. There is little common ground in the Doha negotiating agenda with respect to human rights, labour standards and the environment. Nevertheless, future multilateral integration will be contingent upon the successful lowering of the social costs of trade.
There are two predictions for the future of the trading system. Optimists predict a soft landing for the round; after a pause in negotiations, members will finally agree to a comprehensive deal although it might be smaller than what was hoped for in 2001.
Pessimists predict a hard landing for the WTO; deadlock at Doha will drive deal making towards a 'spaghetti bowl' of many different bilateral and regional arrangements.
According to neoliberal economists, this weakens the multilateral system because many small regional arrangements undermine the most-favoured nation principle enshrined in the GATT. 96 We think that the latter regime shift towards a more regional approach to integration is the more realist outcome because the regionalization process is well underway and has accelerated throughout the past six years of Doha negotiations. This hard landing is not necessarily a bad thing for the world trading system. As we have
argued above, open borders and moderate protectionism can coexist. As we look ahead we have to ask ourselves the most significant question -what role will the WTO's governance model play in the upcoming era of new priorities and evolving alliances?
Will it even survive these seismic shifts in power? 96 Bhagwati 1999.
